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The aim of this paper is to formalise a two-country model of trade liberalisation and techni-
cal change with heterogenous ﬁrms and search-and-matching frictions in the labour mar-
ket. By considering different sectors and factors of production we allow for comparative
advantages and study the trade and technology effects within and between sectors on
wages and employment of skilled and low-skilled workers. Technical change together with
inter-sectoral trade has distributional consequences across the labour force, favouring the
skilled against the low-skilled workers. Intra-sectoral trade counteracts as it increases the
demand for low-skilled workers, too. The overall effects on wages and employment of
skilled and low-skilled workers depend on the extent of technical change, inter-sectoral
trade and intra-sectoral trade.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag präsentiert ein theoretisches Modell, welches die Wirkung von Handelslibe-
ralisierung und technologischem Fortschritt auf Arbeitsmärkten zweier Länder beschreibt.
Dabei werden heterogene Firmen und Sucharbeitslosigkeit unterstellt. Unterschiedliche
Wirtschaftssektoren und Produktionsfaktoren gewährleisten komparative Kostenvorteile und
die Analyse von Handels- und Technologiewirkungen innerhalb und zwischen den Wirt-
schaftssektoren auf hoch und niedrig qualiﬁzierte Arbeitnehmer. Technologischer Fort-
schritt und intersektoraler Handel führen zu dem Verteilungseffekt, dass hoch qualiﬁzierte
gegenüber niedrig qualiﬁzierten Arbeitnehmern begünstigt werden. Intrasektoraler Handel
wirkt dem entgegen, da hierdurch auch die Nachfrage nach niedrig qualiﬁzierten Arbeitneh-
mern steigt. Insgesamt hängen die Lohn- und Beschäftigungseffekte auf hoch und niedrig
Qualiﬁzierte vom Ausmaß technologischen Fortschritts, inter- und intrasektoralem Handel
ab.
JEL classiﬁcation: F12, F16, J64, O33
Keywords: trade, technology, heterogeneous ﬁrms, labour market frictions
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Over the last few decades the value of world trade as a share of world output has grown
rapidly. Also vast developments in the ﬁelds of information technology and communica-
tion proceeded. The period was accompanied by a large increase in income inequality,
measured by the rise in the relative wage of skilled to low-skilled workers, and a large
increase in the relative unemployment rate of low-skilled to skilled workers in developed
countries. These changes raise the important questions of how international trade and
technical change interact and how these forces affect wages and employment of different
skill groups.
The existence of overall gains from trade liberalisation is one of the core propositions of
neoclassical trade theory despite there are both winners and losers within countries due to
distributional consequences of trade. Based on the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of in-
ternational trade the distributional consequences are summarised by the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem (Stolper/Samuelson, 1941). The theorem predicts that trade liberalisation will
beneﬁt an economy’s relatively abundant factor of production and harm the economy’s
relatively scarce factor of production.
But the use of these models is accompanied by several limitations. Since factor mar-
kets of these models are supposed to be frictionless markets, equilibrium unemployment
is ruled out by assumption. But unemployment is a core issue in the political and public
debate about trade liberalisation. Furthermore, although the Heckscher-Ohlin model as-
sumes proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, operating under constant returns to scale, they have no
deterministic role in determining the pattern or commodity composition of trade. Rather
economic activity takes place in sectors, and international competitiveness is fashioned by
relative factor endowments between potential trading partners. In addition, within neoclas-
sical models regarding the distributional consequences of international trade and technical
change, technical change is treated without effect on trade.
In this paper we present a two-country model of trade and technical change to address the
questions of how these forces interact and how these forces affect wages and employment
of skilled and low-skilled workers. According to the discussed limitations of neoclassical
models we take account of the following issues.
First, we account for heterogeneous ﬁrms which differ in their productivity. According Melitz
(2003) ﬁrms have to make a productivity draw from an exogenous distribution which de-
termines whether they produce and export, and an endogenously determined productivity
threshold determines who does and does not export. Only the most productive ﬁrms export
to foreign markets, whereas less productive ﬁrms sell there products domestically.1 By this
means, trade liberalisation leads to reallocation of resources not only across industries but
also across ﬁrms within industries. This is in line with the empirical evidence that much
1 For literature concerning empirical evidence on ﬁrm selection into export markets see e.g.
Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson (1989); Davis/Haltiwanger (1992); Bernard/Jensen (1995, 2004b);
Roberts/Tybout (1997); Clerides/Lach/Tybout (1998); Bartelsman/Doms (2000).
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dustries (see Levinsohn, 1999; Attanasio/Pinelopi/Pavcnik, 2004). Also the literature on
observed heterogeneity in size and export status within sectors motivates to assume pro-
ductivity differences across producers within sectors (e.g. Bernard/Jensen, 1999).
Second, we account for search-and-matching frictions in the labour market. Technical
change leads, in the Schumpeter’s term of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942), to the
destruction of jobs and creation of new jobs. Furthermore, resources specialise in the com-
parative advantage sector. During these processes workers who lose their jobs experience
a period of job search, before ﬁnding new employment. Regarding search and matching
frictions in the labour market Mortensen/Pissarides (1994), and centralised in Pissarides
(2000), present a framework which captures steady-state equilibrium unemployment.
Third, we consider different sectors and factors of production. In the tradition of Heck-
scher-Ohlin model, factors of production are mobile between sectors. This assumption
together with the assumption of heterogeneous ﬁrms operating in sectors allows for re-
allocation of resources within and between sectors. For this reason changes in relative
factor rewards are traced back also to reallocation of resources between sectors, an al-
lowance which is rarely observed in the research on heterogeneous ﬁrms, e.g. considered
by Larch/Lechthaler (2011).
Fourth, ﬁrms face productivity shocks. These shocks arise from technological progress.
The way of introducing it is motivated by Schumpeter’s "creative destruction" idea, in the
sense that technological progress can come about through job destruction and creation
of new and more productive jobs. Job destruction reveals due to obsolescence. New
jobs emerge from new technological innovations which make existing jobs obsolete since
wages grow in new jobs. So, jobs are created at the technological frontier and keep the
same technology until job destruction. This consideration is based upon the requirement
that long-run equilibrium models should be consistent with the existence of constant unem-
ployment rates when there is balanced economic growth (see Pissarides, 2000). Moreover,
the extent of productivity shock depends on the skill intensity of the sector where the ﬁrm
is operating. According to the literature on skill biased technical change we assume that
the productivity of a ﬁrm is positively correlated with its skill intensity. This is in line with
empirical evidence that exporters and large producers in manufacturing tend to be rela-
tively skill intensive (see Bernard/Jensen/Schott, 2006; Bustos, 2011; Verhoogen, 2008;
Alcalá/Hernández, 2010; Molina/Muendler, 2009). It is also in line with various other em-
pirical studies (e.g. Griliches, 1969) which support the idea that skilled labour is relatively
more complementary to equipment capital than is unskilled labour. E.g. Nelson/Phelps
(1966) contend that more educated, able or experienced labour deals better with techno-
logical change.
To feature these issues we trace back to the model of Larch/Lechthaler (2011). We make
use of their framework of two asymmetric countries with two sectors and two factors of
production i.e. allow for comparative advantages and of labour market frictions in a model
with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Within this framework we take account of productivity changes
due to technological progress. Along Pissarides (2000) we take account of the stylized
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that this enables to explain how technical change drives inter-sectoral trade in addition to
intra-sectoral trade where some ﬁrms export and others do not. Hence, we contribute to
the debate over causality between exports and productivity.
There is a large literature which refers to wage inequality and unemployment in an open
economy. In Davis (1998) trade increases wage inequality in the U.S. ﬂexible labour market
and it increases unemployment in Europe facing a binding minimum wage. In this model
unemployment appears among unskilled workers in Europe, rather than among skill groups
of both trading partners. Moore/Ranjan (2005) distinguish between different skill groups
and make use of the labour market Pissarides-Model to allow for search unemployment for
each skill group. There are two tradable goods. The skilled tradable intermediate good is
solely produced with skilled labour and the unskilled tradable intermediate good is solely
produced with unskilled labour. Hence, the model does not allow for labour reallocation
across sectors. The unemployment rate and the real wage in each sector respond to the
price of sectoral output. Against it, Dutt/Mitra/Ranjan (2009) combine the Pissarides labour
market search model with Heckscher-Ohlin international trade theorem and Ricardo trade
model to contribute to differences across countries and factor movements across sectors.
They formalise a national unemployment rate but leave for consideration of different skill
groups.
In contrast, recent research on heterogeneous ﬁrms and unemployment aims to consider
trade of asymmetric countries and its effect on each skill group of each trading part-
ner. A model of heterogeneous ﬁrms and search frictions in a one-sector and closed
economy is regarded by Felbermayr/Prat (2011). Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer (2011) ex-
tend it to a symmetric-country model by considering a one-sector economy. In contrast,
Bernard/Redding/Schott (2007) account for heterogeneous ﬁrms and comparative advan-
tages i.e. asymmetric countries of a two sector and two factors of production economy
but assume perfect labour markets. The results of Bernard/Redding/Schott (2007) and
Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer (2011) are combined by Larch/Lechthaler (2011) to a model of
asymmetric countries with two sectors and two factors of production, heterogeneous ﬁrms
and search-and-matching frictions in the labour market.
The theoretical literature points to differing performance characteristics of exporting and
non-exporting ﬁrms. But there is the debate over the question whether these differences
result from the decision to export or export activity. E.g. Bustos (2011) considers the
concurrence of trade and technological upgrading. She studies the impact of trade liberali-
sation on technology upgrading and shows that ﬁrms in industries facing higher reductions
in tariffs increase their investment in technology faster. The possibility of upgrading results
from the increased revenues produced by trade integration. Burstein/Vogel (2010) model
the interaction between skill-biased technology, international trade and wage inequality be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers and conﬁrm that trade liberalisation increases the rel-
ative demand for skill, analogous to the effect of skill-biased technological change.2 Stud-
2 For further work on technology, trade and inequality see e.g. Acemoglu (2003); Yeaple (2005); Matsuyama
(2007); Zeira (2007); Verhoogen (2008); Helpman/Itskhoki/Redding (2010); Costinot/Vogel (2010) and Van-
noorenberghe (2011).
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both learning by exporting and learning to export (see Greenaway/Kneller, 2007). In-
dependent of the measure of productivity as labour productivity or TFP Bernard/Jensen
(1999) and Bernard/Jensen (2004a) found that productivity growth of exporters is not sig-
niﬁcantly different from non-exporters. This implies that the growth effects from learning by
exporting are not permanent. Furthermore, they provided evidence that new exporters
were already among the best and differed signiﬁcantly from the average non-exporter.
Aw/Roberts/Winston (2007) show that investment in R&D and activity on the export market
leads to higher productivity growth than just exporting. They argue that R&D investments
are necessary for ﬁrms to beneﬁt from their exposure to international markets. Similar
results are given by López (2004). He ﬁnds that investment and productivity rises in the
period before ﬁrms enter the export market but domestic sales are constant. He argues this
is consistent with investment in technology for sales to foreign but not domestic markets.
Hence, literature shows that ﬁrm self-selection into export markets leads to productivity
change through both, learning by exporting and learning to export.
The main results of our model can be summarised as follows. As technological progress
favours the skilled intensive sector more than the low-skilled intensive sector, the sectors
face different productivity changes. With technical change wages of skilled and low-skilled
workers increase in both sectors but to different extents. When trade costs decrease, the
aggregate productivity differences of sectors lead to inter-sectoral trade. The within sector
effects reveal as increasing wages and decreasing unemployment in the export sector
and decreasing wages and increasing unemployment in the import sector. Differences
in wages will cause migration of workers which results in the between sector effects of
increasing unemployment in the export sector and decreasing unemployment in the import
sector. The reallocation of workers between sectors reveals similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem. These effects are counteracted by intra-sectoral trade as it increases the demand
for low-skilled workers.
Section 2 outlines the model whereby 2.1 refers to ﬁnal goods and 2.2 to intermediate
goods production. The labour market equilibrium and thus the wage bargaining process
is described in 2.3. Within 2.4 we take account of the rate of unemployment as well as
the income of unemployment. The conditions of ﬁrm entry and exit of the markets are
considered in 2.5, the between and within sector effects of inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral
trade in 2.6. Section 3 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an economy that is characterised by two different factors of production (skilled
and low-skilled labour) and two different sectors of production. One of the sectors is as-
sumed to be skill intensive. Both the skilled and unskilled workers can switch between the
sectors.
As analysed in Melitz (2003) ﬁrms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity,
implying that the least efﬁcient ﬁrms drop out of the market and only the most efﬁcient
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The labour market is characterised by search and matching frictions as in Pissarides
(2000). Hence, a ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed cost to post a vacancy. This vacancy will be
ﬁlled with a certain probability, which depends on the tightness of the labour market, de-
ﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers.
Technological progress is embodied in new jobs, hence productivity in existing jobs does
not change. With job destruction and creation of new and more productive jobs, ﬁrms face




0 if t < τ
1 if t ≥ τ
}
,
where τ is the instant of productivity shock.3 If technological progress and hence pro-
ductivity shock takes place, then the skilled intensive sector faces a higher ∆φ than the
low-skilled intensive sector. The following derivations apply for t ̸= τ.
2.1 Final Goods
There are two countries, the home country H and the foreign country F. The follow-
ing equations describe the home country, whereby similar deﬁnitions apply for the foreign
country. The preferences of the households for two goods which are produced by two










where α1 + α2 = 1. The total consumption of ﬁnal good i in country H is denoted by CH
i
and the income share spend on ﬁnal good i is denoted by αi.
On the other hand, these two consumption goods are aggregates of intermediate goods,


















where σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of inputs. The
mass MH of available intermediate inputs in country H is produced by monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms and the measure of the set ΩH
i represents the mass MH. The quantity
available of intermediate input ωH
i,j is denoted by q(ωH
i,j). There are k1 varieties of interme-
diate inputs (j = 1,...,k1) produced in sector i = 1 and k2 varieties of intermediate inputs
(j = 1,...,k2) produced in sector i = 2, hence ωH
i,j ∈ ΩH
i . With the normalisation MH it
follows that the rate of unemployment does not decrease with the size of the economy (see
Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer, 2011). Aggregate production covers aggregate consumption
and the various costs that accumulate during production process such as ﬁxed costs of
production and costs of vacancy posting.
3 We use ()-brackets to denote the arguments of functions, otherwise [] and {}.

















i,j) is the price of variety ωH
i,j. In the following we abstain from index j.
2.2 Intermediate Goods
According to the households utility function (1) and the production function of the aggregate


















Thereby, the total income of country H is denoted by Y H.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, each choosing to produce a different variety of intermediate
good. All ﬁrms have different productivity levels indexed by φ(ωH
i ) > 0. Higher productivity
is modeled as producing a variety at lower marginal cost. Since every variety of intermedi-
ate input ωH
i is produced by one ﬁrm, ﬁrms are indexed by φH
i . In order to entry the market
and to start production, ﬁrms must ﬁrst make an initial investment, modeled as a sunk set-
up cost f > 0. Beside the domestic market, producers can serve the foreign market via
exports. Entry into the export market entails again a ﬁxed investment cost fx > 0. These
costs reveal since an exporting ﬁrm must e.g. set up new distribution channels in the for-
eign country or must inform foreign buyers about the products. Trade costs are modeled
as iceberg transportation costs, whereby T ≥ 1 units of a good must be shipped in order
for 1 unit to arrive at destination. At time τ the home country faces a productivity shock.
That means, at time t < τ ﬁrms productivity reveals as φH
i and at time t ≥ τ ﬁrms produc-
tivity reveals as φH
i +∆φH







































where I(τ) is the indicator function that takes value one when t ≥ τ and zero when t < τ
and indexes d and x denote the domestic and export market.
If ﬁrms decide to sell their products both on the domestic and the export market, they allo-
cate their products so as to maximise total revenues. That means, equal marginal revenues
across markets are given and tend to result in pd(φH
i ,τ) = px(φH
i ,τ)/T. This shows that
exporters have to set higher prices in the foreign market reﬂecting the trade costs T to
serve this market. The proof is given in Appendix A.1.


















i ) and L(φH
i ) are the number of skilled and low-skilled workers and βi is the
relative share of skilled worker in total product. S(φH
i ) and L(φH
i ) are inputs in the produc-
tion process for both, the domestic and the foreign market. The ﬁrms number of skilled and
low-skilled worker does not alter at time τ since new and more productive jobs displace
existing jobs.
As a result of sales on the domestic market the revenues of a ﬁrm in country H with pro-
ductivity φH
i are given by Rd(φH
i ,τ) = pd(φH
i ,τ)qd(φH
i ,τ) and from sales on the foreign
market by Rx(φH
i ,τ) = px(φH
i ,τ)qx(φH
i ,τ)/T. Based on these equations, the total rev-







































i ) is the indicator function with value one when the ﬁrm exports and value
zero when the ﬁrm only sells its intermediate inputs on the domestic market.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
Within this section we describe the labour market equilibrium, whereby the labour market
is characterised by search and matching frictions. Wages are bargained individually which
means the following sequence of actions. At each period, the intermediate good producer
decides about the optimal number of vacancies υ, taking the wage rate as given, of which
only a certain share m(θ) is ﬁlled. The matching technology brings together the work-
ers and the ﬁrm and wages are bargained before production takes place. The number of
matches depends negatively on labour market tightness θ = V/U, where V is the total
number of vacancies posted on a speciﬁc labour market and U is the number of unem-
ployed workers on this labour market. All payments are made at the end of each period.
Before beginning of the next period, the match could be resolved due to exogenous rea-
sons with probability ρ. The workforce’s evolution of a ﬁrm is given by
LH
i (t + ∆t) = [1 − ρ]LH




i (t + ∆t) = [1 − ρ]SH
i (t) + m(θH
Si)vH
Si (9)
Solving the game by backward induction, we ﬁrst characterise the ﬁrms optimal vacancy
setting behaviour, and then solve the bargaining problem. The market value of an interme-
diate producer is given by





i ,τ) − wH
Li(t,τ)L(φH
i ) − wH
Si(t,τ)S(φH








i + [1 − δ]GH
i (t + ∆t,τ)}, (10)
where r denotes the interest rate, and wH
Si(t,τ) and wH
Li(t,τ) the wages for skilled and low-
skilled workers, respectively. A ﬁrm faces ﬁxed cost f > 0. The costs of posting a vacancy
are given by c (measured in units of the aggregate good) and the ﬁrm will be destroyed with











subject to production function (7), ﬁrms revenues (8) and evolution of employment (9).
According these constraints it follows
∂LH
i (t + ∆t)
∂LH
i (t)
= 1 − ρ ,
∂SH
i (t + ∆t)
∂SH
i (t)
= 1 − ρ (12)
∂LH











The ﬁrst order conditions for vacancy posting read
cPH
i = [1 − δ] ·
∂GH
i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂LH




i = [1 − δ] ·
∂GH
i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂SH
i (t + ∆t)
· m(θH
Si). (15)
Substituting the constraints into the objective function of the ﬁrm, differentiating with respect
to LH
i and SH































































Hereby, the ﬁrm takes into account the effect of additional employment on the worker’s
wage. Moreover, the probability ρ with which the match could be resolved and the proba-
bility δ with which a ﬁrm will be destroyed are assumed to be independent. According this,
the rate of job destruction is given by s = δ +ρ−δρ and hence it follows, without using the




















i ) + [1 − s]
∂GH
i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂LH






















i ) + [1 − s]
∂GH
i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂SH
i (t + ∆t)
}
.(19)
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a ﬁrm remains constant through time with GH
i (t,τ) = GH
i (t + ∆t,τ). Since optimality
conditions (14) and (15) do not vary with the level of variables vH
Li and vH
Si, the optimal ﬁrm
size remains constant, so that LH
i (t) = LH
i (t+∆t) and SH
i (t) = SH
i (t+∆t). Furthermore,







i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂LH









i (t + ∆t,τ)
∂SH





































Combining these two equations with the ﬁrst order conditions (14) and (15) yields expres-
sions that implicitly determine the optimal pricing behaviour of the ﬁrm, whereby marginal









































The total surplus of a successful match is split between the worker and the ﬁrm. The
worker’s surplus is equal to the difference between the value of being employed EH
Li(t,τ)
(EH
Si(t,τ)) by a ﬁrm and the value of being unemployed UH
Li(t) (UH
Si(t)). The ﬁrm’s surplus





because individual bargaining implies that as in Stole/Zwiebel (1996) every worker is treated
as the last worker employed by the ﬁrm, i.e. the marginal worker. Following Stole/Zwiebel
(1996) we assume that the outcome of bargaining over the division of total surplus from the






















where µ measures the bargaining power of a worker and thus belongs to [0, 1]. Corre-
sponding to Pissarides (2000) the worker’s surplus is given by
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These two equations make clear that because of the risk of unemployment the permanent
income of employed workers, EH
Li(t,τ) (EH




Solving the surplus-splitting rules (26) and (27) needs to reinsert the worker’s surpluses




























i ) + [1 − µ] · rUH
Si(t). (31)
Hereby, the wages wH
Li(t,τ) and wH
Si(t,τ) are functions of L(φH
i ) and S(φH
i ), respec-
tively. Hence, these two equations are linear differential equation in L(φH
i ) and S(φH
i ),






















+ r[1 − µ]UH
Si(t). (33)
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. Based on these solutions of linear differential equations
it can proceeded with the deviation of job creation curves and wage curves.
To derive the job creation curves ﬁrst we reinsert the marginal revenue functions (given
in Appendix (78) and (79)) into the solutions (32) and (33) and differentiate the resulting
equations with respect to L(φH
i ) and S(φH








βi − βiσ − 1














βiσ − βi − σ











































Finally, with regard of marginal revenue functions (given in Appendix (66) and (67)) the job
creation curves reveal as
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Li(t,τ) =
σ − 1
[βi − βiσ − 1]µ + σ



























[βiσ − βi − σ]µ + σ























These equations represent the wage conditions when a ﬁrm and a searching worker meet
and agree to form a match. Once the ﬁrm and the worker meet and a job is created,
production continues until shocks arrive. If the economy is characterised by technologi-
cal progress, it is proﬁtable to the ﬁrm to detach from existing jobs and create new jobs
at technological frontier. Then the ﬁrm faces a positive productivity shock accompanied
by at ∆φH
i higher wages. The proﬁtability of job separation stems from the fact that, be-
cause all new jobs are created on the technological frontier, outside options change with
technological progress.
The job creation curves (38) and (39) are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. To express the wage curves as
a function of θH
Li and θH
Si, respectively, the solutions (32) and (33) of linear differential






























Furthermore, taking account of the value functions of employed and unemployed workers
eliminates the value of unemployment of equations (40) and (41). According Pissarides
(2000) the value functions of unemployed workers are given as
rUH















Si)) is the probability of an unemployed worker to ﬁnd a new
job and zLi (zSi) is the unemployment income. Further, the value functions of employed
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rUH
























Li(t,τ) − rULi(t) and wH
Si(t,τ) − rUSi(t) are replaced by using the wage curves
(40) and (41) and the resulting equations are reinserted into (40) and (41) the wage curves
reveal as
wH





































The equilibrium on the labour market is determined by the job creation curve and the wage
curve. The interacting of these curves gives the equilibrium wage and labour market tight-
ness. The uniqueness of the equilibrium is ensured since the wage curve is increasing in
θH
Li (θH
Si) and the job creation curve decreasing in θH
Li (θH
Si). The way that market tightness
enters the wage equation is through the bargaining power of ﬁrms and workers. Analogue
to Pissarides (2000) that means, a higher θH
Li (θH
Si) indicates that jobs arrive to workers at
higher rate than workers do to vacant jobs, relative to an equilibrium with lower θH
Li (θH
Si).
Then higher wage rates reveal, since the worker’s bargaining power is higher and the ﬁrm’s
bargaining power lower. As in Larch/Lechthaler (2011), referring to Stole/Zwiebel (1996),
the assumption that wages are bargained individually implies that every worker is treated
as the marginal worker. That means, the wage of each worker represent their outside
option. Workers are paid in equal measure across ﬁrms with different productivity levels.
Each ﬁrm employs as many workers as are necessary to ensure that the marginal value of
the last employed worker is equal to the wage.
Based on Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer (2011), trade liberalisation raises aggregate produc-
tivity by affecting the average productivity of ﬁrms. Analogue, also technological progress
raises aggregate productivity by this means. That means, because ﬁrms are on average
more productive and search more intensively for workers the job creation curve shifts up-
wards. The wage curve also shifts upwards because unemployment income is increasing
with aggregate productivity. Thus, it follows the adjustment to an equilibrium where wages
wH
Si(t,τ) and wH
Li(t,τ) and labour market tightness θH
Li and θH
Si are higher, relative to the
equilibrium before technical change and trade liberalisation took place. Hence, technolog-
ical progress and trade liberalisation will affect labour market outcomes to the extent that it
changes aggregate productivity by modifying the average productivity of ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 When wages are bargained individually, the worker’s wages are negotiated
to their outside option. With technological progress outside options and hence wages and
aggregate productivity change. Supplementary, aggregate productivity and hence wages
change due to trade liberalisation. Thus, both technological progress and trade liberalisa-
tion affect labour market outcomes.
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Unemployment income zLi and zSi consists of two different components. These are the
actual income received during unemployment, such as transfer payments, and the imputed
value of time to unemployed workers. By assumption the actual-income component of zLi
and zSi is proportional to average wages, since unemployment insurance beneﬁts may be
indexed to the average wage rate because the taxes used to ﬁnance them are generally
proportional to wages and not lump sum. This is in line with Pissarides (2000) and conﬁrms
the adoption above that unemployment income is increasing with aggregate productivity.
By assumption there are four labour markets, for skilled and low-skilled workers of each
sector. The matching function describes the probability that a vacancy is ﬁlled dependent
on the tightness of the labour market θH
Li and θH
Si. Moreover, the probability of an unem-




Si). Since the rate of
job destruction s captures both the probability with which a match will be resolved and the
















With these conditions the ﬂows in and out of unemployment are equal. Once workers
losing their jobs they experience a period of job search before ﬁnding new employment
by switching between the sectors. The rate of unemployment is a decreasing function of
market tightness.
2.5 Firm Entry and Exit
Analogue to Larch/Lechthaler (2011), who refer to Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer (2011) and
further to Melitz (2003), for each sector there is a large number of prospective entrants.
Prior to entry, ﬁrms are identical. To enter the market, ﬁrms have to pay a ﬁxed and sunk
entry cost f > 0, measured in terms of the ﬁnal consumption good of the sector the ﬁrm
wants to enter. Firms then draw their initial productivity φH
i from a common distribution
g(φH
i ), hence they do not know their productivity until they start production and sell their
goods. The cumulative distribution of g(φH
i ) is denoted by G(φH
i ). The productivity of the
ﬁrm stays the same as long as the ﬁrm exists and t < τ. At time τ the positive productivity
shock due to technical change results in a mean value displacement of distribution g(φH
i ).
Given that the revenues of ﬁrms are increasing in φH
i , there is a threshold φH
id below
which ﬁrms do not take up production. Similarly, there is a threshold φH
ix , necessary to
produce for the foreign market. Hence, with a productivity level between φH
id and φH
ix
ﬁrms will serve only the domestic market. The mean value displacement of distribution
g(φH
i ) at time τ involves a displacement of threshold-values, φH
i = φH
i (τ). The share of













































To characterise the entry threshold φH
id in the following, note that it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm





















i ) = pd(φH
i )qd(φH
i ) − wH
LiL(φH
i ) − wH
SiS(φH















is the proﬁt from domestic sales of the ﬁrm. Hereby, the proﬁts are revenues minus wage
payments, ﬁxed costs and vacancy costs. With evolution of the workforce according equa-
tion (9) and the steady-state conditions LH
i (t) = LH
i (t + ∆t) and SH
i (t) = SH







Si). Equation (55) accounts for the fact
that ﬁrms must make an initial investment to enter the market and pay vacancy costs but
only a period later they recruit workers. During this period, the ﬁrm will be destroyed with
exogenous probability δ so that the ﬁrm never starts production.
Similarly, it can be characterised the choice of exporting. It is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to




























i ) − wH
SiS(φH















is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm when selling their products in foreign markets. This proﬁt has to be
large enough to cover the additional ﬁxed cost fx.
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The free entry condition takes into account the behaviour of prospective entrants. Thus,
entry occurs until expected proﬁts, on the right-hand side, are equal to the entry cost, on
the left-hand side. An entrant will start producing with probability 1−G(φH
id ). Furthermore,
an entrant will also export with probability 1 − G(φH
ix ). New ﬁrms will enter the market as
long as proﬁts exceed the entry cost. This leads to increased competition which drives
down proﬁts until they have reached the entry cost. Similarly, ﬁrms will exit the market if


















i ) is the size of the labour force, equal to an exogenously given total number
of people, and MH
i is the mass of domestic producers in each country. The demand
for labour is given on the left-hand side by the sum of the demand of all domestic ﬁrms
for domestic and export production. The supply of labour is given on the right-hand side
by the number of employed workers. Due to imports from foreign ﬁrms, the number of
available varieties exceeds MH
i and thus, given the share of exporting ﬁrms in (52), is





Proposition 2 The average productivity of ﬁrms depends on the threshold-values φH
id and
φH
ix , respectively. When the ﬁrm’s productivity exceeds these values it starts production
and exports. Technological progress raises the ﬁrm’s productivity up to φH
i +∆φH
i and thus
results in a mean value displacement of the distribution of the productivity of ﬁrms g(φH
i ).
The mean value displacement of g(φH




2.6 Between and Within Sector Effects
In the following we will point out how trade liberalisation and technical change interact and
describe the impact of these two forces on wages and employment of skilled and low-skilled
worker, respectively.




i . That means, it has an effect on the average productivity of ﬁrms and
thus on the aggregate productivity accompanied by a shift in the productivity threshold-
values φH
id and φH
ix that determine whether ﬁrms enter the market and export or do not.
Moreover, along Felbermayr/Prat/Schmerer (2011), as long as ﬁxed foreign distribution
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trade costs or an increase in the number of trade partners raises average productivity of
ﬁrms and hence aggregate productivity. Along Melitz (2003) this results in a reallocation
of labour towards efﬁcient ﬁrms and thus towards exporting ﬁrms and away from domestic
ﬁrms of lower efﬁciency level.
Now we introduce the assumptions that country H is the skill-abundant country and it is
the only country that faces a productivity change due to technical change. In addition, we
suppose that the extent of productivity shock depends on the skill intensity of the sector
where a ﬁrm is operating. This is in line with the literature on skill biased technical change,
so that the productivity of a ﬁrm is positively correlated with its skill intensity. Empirically
support comes from e.g. Bernard/Jensen/Schott (2006); Bustos (2011); Verhoogen (2008);
Alcalá/Hernández (2010) or Molina/Muendler (2009) who show that exporting ﬁrms and
large ﬁrms tend to be relatively skill intensive. Or as Nelson/Phelps (1966) state, more
educated, able or experienced labour deals better with technological change. If sector 1 is
assumed to be the skill intensive sector then these assumptions are summarised by
∆φH
1 > ∆φH
2 > 0 (62)
∆φF
1 = ∆φF
2 = 0 (63)
whereby assumption (62) states that country H faces a larger productivity change in sector
1 than in sector 2. In contrast, with (63), country F faces no alterations. In addition, we
assume that both skilled and low-skilled worker can switch between the sectors within
countries. Internationally, they are immobile.
Technical change in country H increases average productivity. As a result on the one
hand, wages increase since jobs are created on the technological frontier (see (38) and
(39)). On the other hand, since the rate of unemployment is a decreasing function of the
market tightness (see (50) and (51)), it decreases unemployment. We refer to this as
the within sector effects. Hence, both skilled and low-skilled workers get higher wages in
both sectors of country H, but because of assumption (62) to a larger extent in sector 1.
As skilled and low-skilled workers are fully mobile, this leads to movements of workers to
sector 1, until the values of them are equalised between the sectors. Due to these migration
ﬂows, unemployment increases in sector 1. Unemployment in sector 2 goes down since
leaving this sector leads to an increase of the prospects of the remaining workers to ﬁnd a
job. We refer to this as the between sector effects.
As trade costs decrease, inter-sectoral trade between the two countries rises. With trade
liberalisation, competition increases whereby driving out the least productive ﬁrms and
rising average productivity. That means, it leads to selection of efﬁcient ﬁrms into exporting
and of inefﬁcient ﬁrms into exit (analogue to Melitz, 2003). Country H specialises in the
production of the skill intensive good 1, since this sector is characterised by productivity
advantages relative to sector 2 because of assumption (62) as well as it is the comparative
advantage-sector. Hereby, it becomes a net-exporter of goods from sector 1 and a net-
importer of goods from sector 2. The specialisation implies changes in relative prices. The
price in the export sector 1 goes up and the price in the import sector 2 goes down. This
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wages and increase unemployment in the import sector - the within sector effects. The
specialisation results in reallocation of workers between sectors, similar to the traditional
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Differences in wages will cause migration of workers to sector
1 until the values of the workers are equalised between the sectors, and further, has the
consequence of increasing unemployment in sector 1 and decreasing unemployment in
sector 2 - the between sector effects. As the home country is the skill-abundant country,
overall the skilled workers should gain whereas the low-skilled workers should lose both
in terms of wages and employment. But these effects can be overlaid by the effects of
intra-sectoral trade.
The rise of intra-sectoral trade can be discussed also due to decreasing trade costs. Ana-
logue to Larch/Lechthaler (2011), the consideration is as follows. If trade costs become
sufﬁciently low, the consumers love for variety becomes more important, implying that the
demand of country F for goods of sector 2 of country H rises. Despite the fact that country
F can produce these goods relatively cheaper than country H, country H starts to export
these good, too. This results in a increased competition in this sector, whereby the least
productive ﬁrms are driven out of the market. This increases average productivity in sector
2, raises wages and thus enhances the desire to work in this sector.
Overall, there are diverse effects on wages and unemployment of skilled and low-skilled
workers. The results give a theoretical foundation of the interaction of technological progress
and trade between countries with the various labour market effects. Hereby, it depends on
the extent of technical change, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral trade to describe the overall
effects on skilled and low-skilled workers.
3 Conclusion
During the last decades, developed countries have become more and more characterised
by increasing wage inequality and unemployment inequality among different skill groups.
As for wage inequality, neoclassical general equilibrium models mainly trace back to the
two demand-side causes of international trade and technical change. Besides, unemploy-
ment remained on the sidelines. In these models, it can only come from factor market
distortions.
Recent research points to the analysis of trade liberalisation by taking account of equilib-
rium unemployment due to search and matching frictions in the labour market. Moreover,
this literature refers to the fact that exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms co-existed in the
same industry. Entry to and survival in export markets are traced back to the interaction of
sunk costs and productivity heterogeneity of ﬁrms.
In this paper we presented a model which applied for equilibrium unemployment due to
search and matching frictions in the labour market and heterogeneous ﬁrms, differing in
their productivity. We took account of two different sectors and factors of production. Within
this framework, we analysed the effects of technological progress on wages and unemploy-
ment of the two factors, skilled and low-skilled workers. Motivated by Schumpeter’s idea
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creation of new and more productive jobs. Thereby, it raises aggregate productivity by mod-
ifying the average productivity of ﬁrms. As trading partners experience technical change,
and hence productivity shocks, among their sectors at different extents, technology effects
on worker’s wages and employment differ across sectors. The skilled intensive sector is
the favoured sector and therefore it becomes the export sector when trade liberalisation
takes place. As trade liberalisation raises aggregate productivity by modifying the aver-
age productivity of ﬁrms, both, technological progress and trade liberalisation affect labour
market outcomes. Inter-sectoral trade favours the skilled against the low-skilled workers
regarding both, wages and employment. Intra-sectoral trade counteracts as it favours low-
skilled workers, too. The overall effects on wages and employment of skilled and low-skilled
workers depend on the extent of technical change, inter-sectoral trade and intra-sectoral
trade.
The introduction of productivity changes due to technological progress gives rise to new
insights concerning the effects of technical change on international trade. As long as it
affects the economies’ sectors to different extents, it raises inter-sectoral trade if trade
costs are sufﬁciently low. An useful direction for further research would be to evaluate the
theory by empirical data.
A Appendix
A.1 Equalisation of Marginal Revenues
The ﬁrms revenues from sales on the domestic market are given by
Rd(φH
i ,τ) = pd(φH
i ,τ) · qd(φH
i ,τ). (64)
Using the domestic inverse demand for intermediate good (5) and Cobb-Douglas produc-























The partial derivatives with respect to L(φH
i ) and S(φH













































The ﬁrms revenues from sales on the export market are given by
Rx(φH
i ,τ) = px(φH
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The partial derivatives with respect to L(φH
i ) and S(φH














































































A.2 Solution of Linear Differential Equations




























i ) + [1 − µ] · rUH
Si(t), (75)
known as equations (30) and (31) above, which are linear differential equation in L(φH
i )
and S(φH
i ), respectively. In the following we abstain from indexes and do not denote the
arguments of functions. To solve these equations it needs taking account of the marginal
revenues of the ﬁrm with respect to L and S. According (8) with Sd = Sx = S and
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 + r[1 − µ]US. (81)
Thereby, wL, wS, UL, US, L and S are independent of each other and wL and wS are
considered to be functions only of L and S, respectively. Otherwise it would be a system
of differential equations or partial differential equations. Thus, the differential equations
are ordinary linear nonhomogeneous ﬁrst-order differential equations for wL and wS. The
general solutions to the linear differential equations are the sum of the general solutions
of the related homogeneous equations and the particular solutions. The solutions of non-
homogeneous equations are obtained by ﬁnding the particular solutions by the method of
variation of parameters.









L = 0. (82)
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S = 0 (85)
it reveals
wh
S = C · S
  1
. (86)
The method of variation of parameters yields particular solutions of nonhomogeneous
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+ r[1 − µ]US. (94)
The general solutions to the linear differential equations are now the sum of the general
solutions of the related homogeneous equations (84) and (86) and the particular solutions
























+ r[1 − µ]US (96)
with 0 5 C < ∞. If C ̸= 0 the wage equations contained a component larger than zero
which is only dependent on L, S and µ, independent on the production (independent on








+ r[1 − µ]UL (97)
wS =
µσ




+ r[1 − µ]US (98)
known as equations (32) and (33) above.
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